El Dorado Canyon by Joseph Stanik

Author:Joseph Stanik
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781612515809
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2016-12-20T00:00:00+00:00

Constructing the Strike Force

El Dorado Canyon planners studied the composition and size of the strike force as they developed the target list. At the outset Kelso considered a range of attack options but immediately ruled out the use of battleships, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and special operations forces. The battleships were rejected for a number of reasons. First, although all Libyan targets except the Benina Airfield were within range of the 16-inch guns of the Navy’s Iowa-class battleships, none of the dreadnoughts were deployed to the Mediterranean in the spring of 1986. Second, a single battleship would be unable to attack targets in both Tripoli and Benghazi on the same evening. Third, the battleship’s main batteries lacked the precision required to hit targets in crowded urban areas. Finally, the battleship and her supporting task group would be operating close in to the Libyan coast where they would be susceptible to attack. If the battleship or any of her supporting ships suffered any damage, Qaddafi would score an enormous propaganda victory. Tomahawks were eliminated for the same reason they had been rejected in January: few missiles had been programmed for and were available for conventional missions in Libya. Special operations forces were not a practical option either, since their use required ample preparation time and a covert means of insertion and extraction, they involved complicated tactics on the ground, and they presented a high probability of American casualties.25 After weighing a number of critical factors such as weapon accuracy, weight of payload, proximity of targets to civilian population centers, time over target, and survivability of attacking forces, the planners decided that tactical strike aircraft would be best able to provide the safest and most effective means of carrying out the attack. In the words of W Hays Parks, “Tactical air offered the ability to place the greatest weight of ordnance on the targets in the least amount of time while minimizing collateral damage and providing the greatest opportunity for the survival of the entire force.”26

Mindful of the tragic consequences of the 4 December 1983 daylight raid on Syrian antiaircraft batteries in Lebanon, planners decided to strike at night. At night the Libyan air defense system would be at its lowest state of readiness—for example, shoulder-fired optically sighted SAMs would be severely hampered—and the LAAF, owing to its operational history, would least likely challenge any attacking aircraft. A night strike would significantly reduce the chance that an American flier would be taken prisoner, and the civilian population on the ground would be at lower risk, since fewer people would be on the streets. Furthermore, since Qaddafi had confiscated all small arms from his military for fear of a coup and had turned the armory keys over to loyal revolutionary committees and components of the Popular Resistance Forces, striking aircraft could fly a low-altitude approach and skirt below Libyan radars. The United States had in its inventory only two strike aircraft capable of performing precision, low-level night or all-weather missions: the Navy’s A-6E Intruder and the Air Force’s F-111F.

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